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ABSTRACT 
The decision to implement overtopping protection as a dam safety modification alternative can be difficult.  The 
decision involves a conscious decision to allow a dam to overtop for floods above a threshold flood.  If a large flood 
occurs that initiates dam overtopping, there is no turning back, and the dam and the overtopping protection must be 
able to resist the overtopping flows.  The chance of intervention being successful for a dam that is already 
overtopping, should erosion initiate, would be very unlikely.  There is more of a comfort level among many dam 
engineers in providing conventional solutions to a dam overtopping issue.  These traditional measures include 
raising the dam crest to provide additional surcharge space to store a portion of the flood inflows or providing 
additional spillway capacity to more closely match the peak flood inflows.  There is often the perception among 
experienced dam engineers that these traditional measures provide a safer solution and pose less risk than an 
overtopping solution.  This paper will present scenarios that demonstrate that in some cases, overtopping protection 
may be just as safe or the safer alternative, by exposing the downstream population to equal or less risk of dam 
failure during a large flood event.  These scenarios will consist of an embankment dam where a replacement gated 
spillway alternative will be compared to overtopping protection and a concrete dam where raising of the dam will 
be compared to providing overtopping protection for the dam foundation.   
Keywords: Overtopping Protection, Risk, Dam Safety, Modifications. 
1. INTRODUCTION
The Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) relies on information from risk analyses and risk assessments to guide all 
aspects of its dam safety program.  Results of a potential failure modes analysis (PFMA) and risk analysis estimates 
along with the supporting dam safety case are used to assess risk at each dam and make decisions on whether 
additional actions are required to better understand or reduce dam safety risk.  One of the key inputs into the dam 
safety decisions at the end of a dam safety study is the risk estimates related to the key Potential Failure Modes 
(PFMs) for a given dam.  Risk estimates for individual PFMs as well as the total risk are plotted on Reclamation’s f-
N chart shown on Figure 1.  Two measures of risk are portrayed.  The Annualized Failure Probability is the product 
of the probability of the loading (normal operations, flood, or earthquake) and the probability of dam failure given 
the loading.  The Annualized Life Loss is the product of the Annualized Failure Probability and the life loss 
estimated to result from dam failure.  The f-N chart portrays threshold values for increasing justification to take 
action to reduce risk related to the two measures of risk, which are a threshold value of 1E-4 for the Annualized 
Failure Probability, and a threshold value of 1E-3 for the Annualized Life Loss (Reclamation, 2011).  These 
threshold values are intended to reflect society’s tolerance for risk (annualized life loss) and to be consistent with the 
background risk that individuals face (annualized failure probability).  The threshold values are consistent with a 
number of dam safety guidelines worldwide.  In addition to the risk estimates, Reclamation considers the supporting 
arguments for the numerical estimates (the dam safety case) as well as the uncertainty and confidence in the risk 
estimates when making dam safety decisions. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Reclamation’s f-N Chart 
 
This paper will focus on the potential failure mode due to dam overtopping during a large flood, considering both 
the depth and duration of overtopping.  Two examples are presented – one for an embankment dam and one for a 
concrete arch dam.  Both dams have baseline risks which indicate increasing justification to take action to reduce 
risk.  Corrective action studies were initiated at both dams and traditional alternatives as well as overtopping 
alternatives were considered.  The examples will demonstrate how traditional alternatives and overtopping 
protection alternatives might compare in terms of risk reduction. 
1.1. Embankment Dam Example 
Cody Dam is a zoned earthfill embankment dam with a crest that is 790 feet long and 35 feet wide at crest elevation 
3264.0, and that is paved with asphalt-concrete.  The structural height of the embankment is 245 feet and the 
spillway crest is at elevation 3250.0.  The upstream face of the dam slopes at 3H:1V between the embankment crest 
and the reservoir floor.  The downstream face slopes at 3H:1V between the crest and elevation 3125, then at 4H:1V 
from elevation 3125 to the downstream toe.  Both the upstream and downstream faces are protected by a layer of 
riprap. 
 
The existing concrete spillway is 300-feet wide with an uncontrolled ogee crest and a chute and hydraulic jump 
stilling basin.  The existing spillway has a design capacity of 36,000 ft3/sec at reservoir water surface elevation 
3261.0.   
 
A hydrologic hazard study was conducted for Cody Dam and frequency flood hydrographs were then developed and 
routed through Cody Dam.  Some of the key results from the hydrologic hazard study and the flood routing study are 
 
presented in Table 1.  The studies indicate that Cody Dam will be overtopped for a flood with a return period 
between 1000 and 10,000 years.  The dam is by projected to overtop by 10 feet (average depth of flow over dam 
crest) for the PMF, which is very close in peak and volume to the 200,000-year flood event. 
 
















100 30,100 36,440 5.0 0 0 
500 45,600 69,818 2.4 0 0 
1,000 67,000 89,723 0.5 0 0 
10,000 105,000 184,957 -1.4 3,400 3 
50,000 140,000 277,130 -4.6 20,400 8 
100,000 175,000 327,962 -7.2 40,000 12 
200,000 240,000 567,427 -10.0 65,500 16 
          AEP – Annual Exceedance Probability  
1.1.1. Potential Failure Mode 
Based on the flood routing results, it was apparent that a potential failure mode related to overtopping of Cody Dam 
during a flood that exceeds the magnitude of a 1000-year event should be investigated further.  The following 
potential failure mode description was developed: 
 
The dam overtops during a large flood and erosion initiates at the change in slope along the downstream 
slope of the dam, at elevation 3125.  The erosion rapidly results in a large scour hole.  Headcutting ensues 
and erosion progresses upstream through repeated headcutting and localized slope failure.  The headcutting 
progresses through the dam crest and the dam is breached. 
 
A team risk analysis was conducted to evaluate this potential failure mode as well as other potential failure modes 
for Cody Dam. 
1.1.2. Risk Estimates 
Annualized failure probabilities for the flood overtopping potential failure mode were estimated for the baseline case 
and a summary of the event tree estimates is provided in Table 2.  The event tree used is simple.  It includes the 
assumption that if the dam overtops, failure will be imminent and only three conditional events are considered – 
Dam Overtops, Erosion Occurs and Headcutting Initiates, and Headcut Proceeds to Dam Breach.  For the 1000- to 
10,000-year flood load range under baseline conditions, it was estimated the probability of dam overtopping was 
approaching likely (0.8; based on the fact that for smaller floods in this load range the dam would not be expected to 
overtop).  For all other flood load ranges, it was estimated that the dam would be very likely (0.99) to overtop.  
Given that the dam overtops, it was judged that erosion occurring and headcutting initiating was very likely (0.99) 
for all flood load ranges.  Given that erosion has occurred and headcutting has initiated it was generally estimated 
that breach of the dam was very likely (0.99), except for the 1000- to 10,000-year flood load range, where it was 
judged to be likely (0.9).  This was due to the consideration that for floods in the range of a 1000- to 10,000-year 
event, the flood duration may not be sufficient to progress all the way to dam breach.  Based on the estimates made 
for each flood load range, the total annualized failure probability was determined by summing the estimates for the 
four branches.  This resulted in a total annualized failure probability of 7.2E-4 (the flood overtopping potential 
failure mode was the dominant potential estimated with 90 percent of the risk being contributed by this potential 
failure mode), which exceeds Reclamations Public Protection Guideline value of 1E-4 and provides increasing 
 
justification to take action to reduce risk.  For the purpose of the examples in this paper, only annualized failure 
probability estimates are considered and they are portrayed as single value estimates.  Life loss consequences and 
the annualized life loss estimates, as well as ranges in the estimates that reflect the inherent uncertainty in the risk 
estimates, are also not portrayed. 
 
















1k to 10k 0.0009 0.8 0.99 0.9 6.4E-4 
10k to 50k 0.00008 0.99 0.99 0.99 7.7E-5 
50k to 100k 0.00001 0.99 0.99 0.99 9.7E-6 
100k to 200k 0.00001 0.99 0.99 0.99 9.7E-6 
     7.2E-4 
 
Since the baseline estimate indicated justification to take action to reduce risk, modification alternatives that reduced 
the probability of the dam overtopping and the dam breaching during a large flood event were considered.  The two 
alternatives were a more traditional option of providing a new replacement gated spillway and a second alternative 
involving overtopping protection consisting of precast concrete blocks on the downstream face of the dam.   
 
The replacement spillway alternative consisted of a spillway regulated by three 25-foot wide by 22-foot high radial 
gates that has a capacity of 45,500 ft3/s at elevation 3261.0.  The spillway was designed to pass the PMF with 3 feet 
of freeboard.  A gated spillway was chosen because there was not a site for a wider uncontrolled spillway and the 
gated spillway allowed for significant additional spillway capacity within the constraint of the existing dam crest 
elevation.  The gated spillway did create a vulnerability in terms of spillway operation reliability. 
 
The initial flood routings assumed that all three spillway gates were fully functional during a flood and that the full 
spillway capacity was realized for a given gate opening.  The routings evaluated the change in spillway discharge for 
more frequent floods under the modified gated operation, as compared to the baseline condition.  Operations will 
limit releases to no more than the inflow at a given point during the flood, and it was concluded that gated spillway 
operations would not significantly increase downstream releases.  Flood routings were also performed in which one 
of the spillway gates was assumed to be inoperable during the entire flood routing.  This simulated an issue with a 
single gate for the entire flood or an issue that would affect multiple gates for a portion of the flood.  Issues could 
consist of debris plugging of the spillway, inability of power supplies and backup power supplies to perform, 
operator error or an operator intentionally holding back on spillway releases to minimize downstream flooding or 
electrical/mechanical issues with the gate operating system.  The reduced risk with the replacement gated spillway in 
place was estimated.  After considering the potential issues described above, the risk analysis team concluded that 
there was a 5 percent chance that the full spillway capacity would not be realized during a flood.  The relatively low 
probability was based on the lack of large trees in the drainage basin, the fact that redundant power supplies are 
provided and the fact that the gates are well maintained and the gates and power supply are exercised regularly.  
This probability was assigned to all flood load ranges as it was generally thought to be independent of the flood 
magnitude.  For the 95 percent chance that the spillway capacity was not restricted, all floods can be passed, 
including the PMF.  The only probability of dam overtopping and potential dam failure is associated with reduced 
spillway capacity.  Based on the flood routing results, the risk estimates made by the risk analysis team are 
summarized in Table 3.  For the Dam Overtops event, the probability was estimated as 0.5 for the 1000 to 10,000 
year event.  This estimate was based on the flood routing results, which indicated that the dam would not overtop for 
floods in the lower half of this range but would be expected to overtop for floods in the upper half of the range.  The 
estimates for the Erosion Occurs and Headcutting Initiates and Headcut Proceeds to Breach events were the same as 
those for the baseline condition.  The total annualized failure probability was estimated to be 2.5 E-5.  This indicates 
that when gate reliability is considered, the replacement gated spillway alternative reduced risk to almost an order of 

























1k to 10k 0.0009 0.05 0.5 0.99 0.9 2.0E-5 
10k to 
50k 0.00008 0.05 0.99 0.99 0.99 3.9E-6 
50k to 
100k 0.00001 0.05 0.99 0.99 0.99 4.9E-7 
100k to 
200k 0.00001 0.05 0.99 0.99 0.99 4.9E-7 
      2.5 E-5 
 
A second alternative consisting of placing precast blocks on the downstream face of the dam was also considered as 
a modification alternative.  The blocks had no effect on the probability of the dam overtopping, but they did 
significantly improve the dam’s ability to resist the overtopping flows without experiencing erosion.  If the blocks 
remained in place, the team judged that there would be almost no chance of erosion initiating and the dam 
eventually breaching.  The team did conclude that there was a chance that an individual block or blocks could fail 
and that this could lead to erosion, failure of more blocks and eventually headcutting and a breach of the dam.  The 
team altered the event tree to consider the following events after the dam overtopped:  Block Fails; Erosion Initiates 
at Failed Block; Additional Blocks are Undermined and Fail; and, Headcut Proceeds to Breach (see Table 4 for 
estimates for each of these events by flood load range; the estimates for the Dam Overtopping event were not 
changed from the baseline condition, as the overtopping protection did not alter this).  The team judged that the 
probability of a block failing would vary from 5 percent to 10 percent for the flood load ranges considered.  Failure 
of a block was judged to most likely occur due to debris within overtopping flows impacting on blocks.  The risk 
analysis team believed that debris loading would increase with the magnitude of the flood.  There was some 
uncertainty in this estimate, given the difficulty in analyzing blocks for this type of failure.  The team ultimately 
relied on the successful operation of this type of overtopping protection at other dams and the fact that there was a 
limited source of debris in the drainage basin.  The team also thought the erosion would be very likely (0.99) to 
initiate if a block failed and that the chance of additional blocks failing would be slightly less than likely (0.8) to 
very likely (0.99) for the floods considered.  Given the previous events occur, the team thought that the headcutting 
leading to dam breach would vary from likely (0.9) to very likely (0.99).  The risk estimates for the overtopping 
protection alternative are summarized in Table 4.  The total annualized failure probability was estimated to be 3.6 E-
5, which was below the threshold value of 1 E-4 but by less than an order of magnitude. 
 






















1k to 10k 0.0009 0.8 0.05 0.99 0.8 0.9 2.6E-5 
10k to 50k 0.00008 0.99 0.05 0.99 0.9 0.99 3.5E-6 
50k to 
100k 0.00001 0.99 0.07 0.99 0.95 0.99 6.5E-7 
100k to 
200k 0.00001 0.99 0.10 0.99 0.99 0.99 9.6E-7 
       3.1E-5 
 
 
1.1.3. Alternative Evaluation 
This example addresses the high baseline risk for an embankment dam from flood overtopping.  The baseline risk 
exceeds the threshold value for annualized failure probability by a considerable amount (7.2 E-4 compared to the 
threshold value of 1 E-4), indicating that there is increasing justification to take action to reduce risk.  Two 
alternatives were evaluating for reducing the risk of flood overtopping – constructing a replacement spillway with 
greater capacity and providing overtopping protection consisting of precast concrete blocks on the downstream face 
of the dam.  Both alternatives were designed for the PMF, which is close in magnitude to a 200,000-year event.  The 
replacement spillway option was designed to prevent all conceivable floods from overtopping the dam, but is 
dependent on the full capacity of the spillway being realized during a flood.  The overtopping protection option was 
designed to allow dam overtopping but to armor the downstream face to prevent erosion that could lead to 
headcutting and breach of the dam, but is dependent on the integrity of the precast blocks.  If both alternatives 
performed perfectly, the risk of flood overtopping dam failure would be negligible, but the vulnerabilities inherent in 
both designs create some risk of dam failure.  The risk estimates indicate that the risk reduction achieved by both 
alternatives are comparable – an annualized life loss estimate of 2.5 E-5 for the spillway replacement alternative and 
3.1 E-5 for the overtopping protection alternative.  Both alternatives provide risks that are close to an order of 
magnitude below the threshold value of 1 E-4. 
1.2. Concrete Dam Example 
Bison Dam is a concrete arch dam containing approximately 147,300 yd3 of concrete.  The dam has a structural 
height of 199 feet and a hydraulic height of 195 feet, and the 15-foot-wide crest is about 960 feet long at elevation 
4725.5.  The dam has a maximum base width of 117 feet.  Parapets are located on the upstream and downstream 
edges of the crest, with the top of the parapets at elevation 4729.0.  The upstream face of the dam is vertical from 
abutment to abutment and is curved on a radius of 405 feet.  The downstream face has a variable slope from crest to 
base and from crown to abutment, and gradually increasing curvature toward the base of the dam.  The dam 
foundation is generally competent except for a 30-foot wide fractured zone between two inactive faults on the left 
abutment of the dam. 
 
The spillway is a morning-glory-type spillway located in the left abutment.  From the drop inlet, discharges pass 
through a 29.5-foot-diameter concrete-lined tunnel which then discharges into the Moon River.  Maximum capacity 
of the spillway, with a reservoir water surface elevation of 4729.0, is approximately 50,000 ft3/s.   
 
A hydrologic hazard study was conducted for Bison Dam and frequency flood hydrographs were then developed and 
routed through Bison Dam.  Some of the key results from the hydrologic hazard study and the flood routing study 
are presented in Table 5.  The studies indicate that Bison Dam will be overtopped for a flood with a return period 
between 100 and 500 years.  The dam is projected to overtop by about 15 feet for the PMF.  The PMF hydrograph is 
slightly smaller than the hydrograph for the 1,000,000-year flood event. 
 
 
Table 5. Frequency Peak discharges and volumes for Bison Dam. 
 














Stream Power Range 
(kW/m2) 
 
100 23,817 36,440 2.5 0 n/a 
500 40,486 69,818 -2.1 9100 25 to 100 
1,000 49,644 89,723 -3.4 19,600 50 to 250 
10,000 90,874 184,957 -6.9 57,900 100 to 400 
50,000 132,029 277,130 -9.3 90,300 200 to 700 
100,000 153,606 327,962 -10.4 107,400 250 to 800 
1,000,000 243,500 567,427 -14.9 182,600 350 to 1200 
1.2.1. Potential Failure Mode 
Based on the routing results, a potential failure mode related to overtopping of Bison Dam during a flood that 
exceeds the magnitude of a 100-year event was identified.  The following potential failure mode description was 
developed: 
 
During a large flood event, the dam overtops and the overtopping flow forms a high velocity jet that 
impinges on the dam foundation.  The impinging jet initiates erosion of the foundation on the left abutment 
of the dam where the rock is highly fractured, creating a scour hole.  As the overtopping continues, the 
scour hole deepens and is extended upstream by headcutting.  The headcutting results in a portion of the 
dam to be undermined.  The loss of foundation support causes overstressing in the dam which cannot be re-
distributed.  The dam cracks and fails due to a removable section being created. 
 
A team risk analysis was to evaluate this and also consider other potential failure modes for Bison Dam. 
1.2.2. Risk Estimates 
The potential failure mode required an evaluation of the potential for the foundation rock to erode when exposed to 
overtopping flows.  The concept of using a rock mass index to correlate with the power it would take to remove the 
rock was original developed by Kirsten (1983) to characterize the rip-ability of earth materials using mechanical 
equipment and its associated horsepower.  This was extended to examine the removal of rock from flowing water, 
and at that time the term “erodibility index” was coined.  This index was correlated empirically to the erosive power 
of flowing water, or the energy rate of change, termed “stream power”.  Data from the performance of unlined 
spillways in both soil and rock were used to calibrate the method for erosion potential.   
 
The stream power – erodibility index method can be used to estimate the likelihood of rock erosion initiating.  The 
current use of this method is well documented (Annandale, 2006).  The erodibility index (and its possible 
variability) represents how erodible the foundation material is.  It is relatively simple to calculate.  The erodibility 
index, Kh, is calculated from: 
 
Kh = Ms Kb Kd Js    (1) 
 
Ms is the mass strength, usually defined as the uniaxial compressive strength (UCS) for rock (expressed in MPa) 
when the strength is greater than 10 MPa, and (0.78)(UCS)1.05 when the strength is less than 10 MPa.  Kb defines the 
particle or fragment size of rock blocks that form the mass, which can be determined from joint spacing or rock 
mass classification parameters.  The simplest and most straight forward relationship is Kb = RQD/Jn, where Jn is a 
 
modified joint set number.  Kd describes the interblock strength, and is usually taken as Jr/Ja, where Jr and Ja are 
based on joint surface characteristics defined by Barton's Q-system.  The relative shape and orientation of the blocks 
is accounted for by the Js parameter.  This represents the ease with which the water can penetrate the discontinuities 
and dislodge the blocks.   
 
The stream power represents the erosive power of the overtopping flows, and is much more complicated to 
rigorously compute.  In the case of a plunging jet falling onto geologic materials, the jet will break up to some extent 
while falling through the air, reducing its energy and potential for producing erosion.  However, as a conservative 
simplification, it can be assumed that all of the kinetic energy from an intact falling intact jet is dissipated on direct 
impact to the rock surface without any break-up of the jet, and the stream power can be estimated (in KW/m2) from:  
 
P = γqH/d (2) 
 
 
where γ is the unit weight of water (9.82 KN/m3), q is the unit discharge at the location being examined (m3/s/m), H 
is the head or height through which the jet falls (m), and d is the thickness of the jet as it impacts the rock (m).  This 
method will provide an indication as to the likelihood that erosion will initiate, but if so, additional judgment is 
needed as to whether the erosion will progress to the point of undermining and failing the dam.   
 
The stream power-erodibility index method was used to evaluate the potential for erosion at Bison Dam.  Ranges of 
erodibility index values were calculated for two different foundation rock types and are shown in Table 6.  Ranges 
of stream power values for different return period floods were also calculated and are provided in Table 5.  With 
these two sets of information, an evaluation was made on the potential for foundation erosion for different flow 
conditions.  This evaluation was aided by using logistic regression results obtained by Wibowo et al. (2005) using 
data originally collected by Annandale (1995) from field observations from spillway channels and plunge pools.  
Figure 2 provides the results of the Wibowo et al. (2005) study along with data from Bison Dam.  The leftmost 
plotted rectangle represents the conditions for a jet impinging on the fractured portion of the dam foundation, for the 
full range of spillway flows. 
 
Table 6.  Erodibility Index Values for Different Materials. 
 
Material Erodibility Index Threshold Stream Power Density 
(kW/m2) 
Concrete - low 6400 715 
Concrete - high 8500 885 
Fractured rock - low 200 53 
Fractured rock - high 400 89 
Hard foundation rock - low 7100 603 




Figure 2.  Graph for estimating likelihood of erosion (after Wibowo, 2005) 
Based on the results described above, annualized failure probabilities for the flood overtopping potential failure 
mode were estimated for the baseline case and a summary of the event tree estimates is provided in Table 7.  The 
event tree used considers three conditional events for a given range of flood loading – Dam Overtops, Erosion 
Initiates and the Dam Undermined and Loads Don’t Redistribute and the Dam Fails.  For the 100- to 500-year flood 
load range under baseline conditions, it was estimated the probability of dam overtopping was approaching likely 
(0.8).  For all other flood load ranges, it was estimated that the dam would be very likely (0.99) to overtop.  Given 
that the dam overtops, it was judged that erosion occurring and the dam being undermined ranged from 0.1 
(unlikely) to 0.99 (very likely) for the full range of floods considered.  These estimates were based on the stream 
power values for a given flood loading range and where these values plotted on Figure 2 along with the range of 
erodibility index values for the weaker foundation rock.  Given that erosion has occurred and the dam is undermined 
it was estimated that the probability of the dam not being able to redistribute the loads would range from 0.01 for the 
100- to 500-year flood load range to 0.9 for the 100,000- to 1,000,000-year flood load range.  The justification by 
the risk analysis team was that for smaller flows the extent of dam undermining would be small due to the duration 
of overtopping flows but for the largest floods undermining would be more extensive with longer durations of 
overtopping.  Based on the estimates made for each flood load range, the total annualized failure probability was 
determined by summing the estimates for the four branches.  This resulted in a total annualized failure probability of 
1.7E-4 (the flood overtopping potential failure mode was the dominant potential estimated with 95 percent of the 
risk being contributed by this potential failure mode), which exceeds Reclamations Public Protection Guideline 
value of 1E-4 and provides increasing justification to take action to reduce risk.   
 



















100 to 500 0.008 0.8 0.1 0.01 6.4E-6 
500 to 1k 0.001 0.99 0.5 0.02 9.9E-6 
1k to 10k 0.0009 0.99 0.99 0.05 4.4E-5 
10k to 50k 0.00008 0.99 0.99 0.5 4.0E-5 
50k to 
100k 0.00001 0.99 0.99 0.7 6.9E-6 
100k to 
1000 k 0.00001 0.99 0.99 0.9 8.0E-6 
     1.7E-4 
 
Since the baseline estimate indicated justification to take action to reduce risk, modification alternatives that reduced 
the probability of the dam overtopping and the dam breaching during a large flood event were considered.  The two 
alternatives were a more traditional option of raising the dam and a second alternative involving overtopping 
protection consisting of reinforced concrete overlays over the fractured portion of the dam foundation.   
 
The dam raise consisted of raising the dam crest by 10 feet, which allowed the 10,000-year flood to be passed with 1 
foot of freeboard.  Flood routings were performed for the raised dam and it was concluded that Bison Dam would 
overtop for a flood with a return period of between 10,000 and 50,000 years.  Stream power calculations from the 
baseline condition for various overtopping flows were used (all parameters are held constant except the return period 
of the flood assigned to discharges) and the flood overtopping annualized failure probability was re-estimated.  The 
results are shown in Table 8 and indicate that the annualized failure probability would be reduced to 1.6 E-5, about 
an order of magnitude below the threshold value for increasing justification to take action to reduce risk of 1 E-4.   
 


















100 to 500 0.008 0 n/a n/a 0 
500 to 1k 0.001 0 n/a n/a 0 
1k to 10k 0.0009 0 n/a n/a 0 
10k to 50k 0.00008 0.5 0.1 0.9 3.6E-6 
50k to 
100k 0.00001 0.99 0.5 0.9 4.4E-6 
100k to 
1000 k 0.00001 0.99 0.9 0.9 8.0E-6 
     1.6E-5 
 
The overtopping protection alternative consisted of 10-foot (minimum thickness) reinforced concrete overlays 
placed over the fractured portion of the left abutment foundation downstream of the dam.  The overlays extended 30 
feet on either side of the fractured zone and 100 feet downstream of the toe of the dam.  The stream power-
erodibility index evaluation considered the same stream power estimates from the baseline condition but used 
erodibility index values for concrete, as shown in Table 6.  The combination of stream power values and erodibility 
index values for the full range of spillway overtopping flows are depicted as the plotted rectangle on the right side of 
Figure 2.  This information was used to estimate the annualized failure probability from flood overtopping for the 
overtopping protection alternative.  The results of this estimate are shown in Table 9, which indicates that the risk 
would be reduced more than an order of magnitude below the annualized failure probability threshold value of  
1 E-4. 
 



















100 to 500 0.008 0.8 0.01 0.01 6.4E-8 
500 to 1k 0.001 0.99 0.01 0.02 2.0E-7 
1k to 10k 0.0009 0.99 0.01 0.05 4.5E-7 
10k to 50k 0.00008 0.99 0.02 0.5 7.9E-7 
50k to 
100k 0.00001 0.99 0.20 0.7 1.4E-6 
100k to 
1000 k 0.00001 0.99 0.40 0.9 3.6E-6 
     6.5E-6 
1.2.3. Alternative Evaluations  
This example addresses the baseline risk for a concrete arch dam from flood overtopping, that is just above 
Reclamation’s threshold value for increasing justification to take action to reduce risk.  The baseline risk exceeds the 
threshold value for annualized failure probability (1.7 E-4 compared to the threshold value of 1 E-4).  Two 
alternatives were evaluating for reducing the risk of flood overtopping – raising the dam by 10 feet and providing 
overtopping protection consisting of reinforced concrete overlays over an erodible portion of the dam foundation 
downstream of the dam.  The dam raise was designed for the 10,000-year flood and the overtopping protection 
alternative was designed for the PMF, which is close in magnitude to a 1,000,000-year event.  The dam raise was 
designed to prevent overtopping for floods up to and slightly greater than a 10,000-year event.  The overtopping 
protection option was designed to allow dam overtopping but to armor the vulnerable portion of the dam foundation.  
The risk estimates indicate that the risk reduction achieved by both alternatives is significant and well below the 
threshold value of 1 E-4.  The annualized failure probability estimate for the dam raise is 1.6 E-5, and is reduced 
even further to 6.5 E-6 for the overtopping protection alternative. 
1.3. Conclusions  
Traditional modification alternatives for addressing a flood overtopping potential failure mode focus on preventing 
overtopping of the dam.  This can be accomplished by increasing the spillway discharge capacity, raising the dam 
which allows more of the flood to be stored or a combination of these two approaches.  Overtopping protection 
alternatives allow the dam to overtop but are designed to prevent the overtopping flows from initiating erosion of the 
dam or dam foundation that could lead to dam breach.  When comparing the two categories of approaches, 
traditional approaches are often perceived as posing less risk of dam failure.  The examples presented in this paper 
demonstrate that this is not always the case.  Depending on the circumstances, overtopping protection alternatives 
may reduce risk to comparable levels as traditional alternatives, especially when the vulnerabilities and limitations 
of traditional alternatives are considered.  There may be cases when traditional alternatives pose less risk than 
overtopping protection alternatives, but a careful consideration of all the potential vulnerabilities and risks should be 
included in the selection process for modification alternatives.  All designs have some vulnerabilities and a thorough 
identification and evaluation of these vulnerabilities must be performed.  The design should include provisions to 
minimize these vulnerabilities. 
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